Lucy Johnson aka Lucy Macleod v. Gary Watts M.D., and Douglas Kohler, M.D. : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Lucy Johnson aka Lucy Macleod v. Gary Watts
M.D., and Douglas Kohler, M.D. : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark Newhall; Law Office of Clark Newhall, M.D., J.D.; attorney for appellant.
Curtis J. Drake, Scott a. DuBois, Tawni J. Sherman; Snell & Wlimer LLP; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Johnson v. Watts, No. 20031019 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4702
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY JOHNSON aka LUCY 
MACLEOD, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS, M.D., 
Appellee and Defendant 
and 
DOUGLAS KOHLER, M.D. 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE GARY WATTS, 
M.D. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20031019-CA 
District Court Case No. 010400391 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
Clark Newhall (7091) 
Law Office of Clark Newhall, M.D. 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3757 
Mail to: P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0284 
Telephone: (801) 363-8888 
Facsimile: (801) 596-8888 
Attorney for Appellant 
Lucy Johnson aka Lucy MacLeod 
J.D. 
Curtis J. Drake (0910) 
Scott A. DuBois (7510) 
Tawni J. Sherman (8133) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Gary Watts, M.D. 
FILED 
UTAH APELLATE COURTS 
FILED J U N 1 5 20fe 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 1 4 ?M4 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LUCY JOHNSON aka LUCY 
MACLEOD, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY WATTS, M.D., 
Appellee and Defendant 
and 
DOUGLAS KOHLER, M.D. 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE GARY WATTS, 
M.D. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20031019-CA 
District Court Case No. 010400391 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
Clark Newhall (7091) 
Law Office of Clark Newhall, M.D. 
320 West 200 South, Suite 100B 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3757 
Mail to: P.O. Box 284 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0284 
Telephone: (801) 363-8888 
Facsimile: (801) 596-8888 
J.D. 
Curtis J. Drake (0910) 
Scott A. DuBois (7510) 
Tawni J. Sherman (8133) 
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 257-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 257-1800 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Gary Watts, M.D. 
Attorney for Appellant 
Lucy Johnson aka Lucy MacLeod 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT , 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
The Facts Underlying Ms. Johnson's Medical Malpractice Claim 3 
Ms. Johnson's Expert Testimony 4 
The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment to Dr. Watts 6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
I. DR. WATTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENCE OF DR. KOHLER, A SPECIALIST TO WHOM DR. 
WATTS REFERRED MS. JOHNSON 11 
A. There is No Cause of Action for Negligent Referral. Even if this 
Court Finds such a Cause of Action Exists Under Utah Law, As a 
Matter of Law Ms. Johnson Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient to 
Make Out that Cause of Action 12 
B. Dr. Watts' Referral of Ms. Johnson to a Qualified Specialist was not 
the Proximate Cause of Her First or Second Surgery ^  nor was it the 
Proximate Cause of Her Claimed Damages from Those Surgeries. 
Dr. Watts did not Participate in the Decision to Perform Surgery on 
Ms. Johnson 16 
C. Utah Law Should not Favor a Policy of Discouraging Physicians 
From Referring Patients to Qualified Specialists When the Referring 
Physician is Unable to Properly and Completely Treat the Patient's 
Complaints 17 
II. DR. WATTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES 
ALLEGEDLY FLOWING FROM MS. JOHNSON'S SECOND 
SURGERY 18 
i 
III. MS. JOHNSON HAS CONCEDED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
APPROPRIATE ON ANY CLAIMS THAT HER POST-NOVEMBER 24, 
1998 DAMAGES WERE CAUSED BY DR. WATTS 21 
CONCLUSION.... 23 
ADDENDUM 24 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Bailey v. Bavles. 2002 UT 58,110, 52 P.3d 1158 12 
Bansasine v. Bodell. 927 P.2d 675, (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 17 
Billebault v. DiBattiste, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 7399, *15 (E.D. Pa. 1998) 13 
Carson v. Fine. 867 P.2d 610, 617 (Wash. 1994) 14 
Dipoma v. McPhie. 2001 UT 61,118, 29 P.3d 1225 12 
Estate of Travnor v. Bloomsburg Hosp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415-16 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ...13 
Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973 (Utah 1993) 20, 22 
Hopkins v. Mills-Kluttz, 77 S.W.3d624, 627-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) 13 
Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 (Utah 1996) 17 
Reed v. Bascon. 530 N.E.2d 417, 421 (111. 1988) 
Ruane v. Stillwell. 600 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) 13 
View Condo Owners Ass'n v. MSICO. L.L.C.. 2004 UT App 104 1 
Weidner v. Nassau. 1993 Pa. D.&C. LEXIS 8, ** 2 (1993) 13 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-2(2)G) 1 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(l 1) 24 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) 2,3 
ARTICLES 
Am. Jur.2d Physicians & Surgeons § 166 14 
Am. Jur.2d Physicians & Surgeons $ 167 14 
Liability of One Physician or Surgeon for Malpractice of Another, 85 A.L.R.2d 889, *3 
(2003) 13 
iii 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
The caption of this case identifies all parties to this proceeding. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The court of appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated section 78-2a-2(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Should the grant of summary judgment to appellee Gary Watts, M.D. ("Dr. 
Watts") be affirmed because, as a matter of law, appellant has failed to state a 
claim for negligent referral? 
2. Should the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Watts be affirmed because, 
as a matter of law, appellant has failed to show a causal connection between 
Dr. Watts' treatment of appellant from November 6-9, 1998 and the 
injuries she claims to have suffered? 
3. Should the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Watts be affirmed because, 
as a matter of law, appellant failed to show a causal connection between Dr. 
Watts' treatment of her to any harm or injury she claims to have suffered after her 
discharge from the hospital on November 24, 1998? 
This court reviews '"the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment for 
correctness, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the losing party. [This court] 
also review[s] the trial court's determinations of law for correctness.'" View Condo. 
Owners Ass'n v. MSICO, L.L.C, 2004 UT App 104,1fl4 (citation omitted). These issues 
were preserved below in Dr. Watts' motion for summary judgment and accompanying 
memoranda. (R. 218-19; 220-81; 402-10.) 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (stating summary judgment "shall be rendered if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Lucy Johnson ("Ms. Johnson"1) appeals from an order of summary 
judgment in favor of defendant Dr. Watts. Ms. Johnson sued her nephew, Dr. Watts, a 
radiologist, contending that he negligently referred Ms. Johnson to co-defendant Douglas 
Kohler, M.D. ("Dr. Kohler"), a surgeon. Ms. Johnson also claimed that if Dr. Watts had 
not referred her to Dr. Kohler, she would not have undergone surgery to remove her 
gallbladder. Finally, Ms. Johnson argued that Dr. Watts' care of Ms. Johnson for a 2 1/2 
day period after the surgery, in Dr. Kohler's absence, was negligent. 
On July 7, 2003, the Fourth District Court issued a memorandum decision granting 
summary judgment to Dr. Watts, and on July 22, 2003 entered an order dismissing Ms. 
Johnson's claims against Dr. Watts with prejudice. On October 24, 2003 the order 
1
 During the pendency of this litigation, plaintiff divorced and resumed her use of the 
name "Lucy Johnson." Throughout the litigation, however, plaintiff was referred to by 
all parties as "Lucy MacLeod." In her opening brief, appellant referred to herself as "Ms. 
Johnson." For purposes of simplicity, Dr. Watts will follow appellant's lead and refer to 
her as "Ms. Johnson." 
granting summary judgment was certified as final pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Facts Underlying Ms. Johnson's Medical Malpractice Claim 
In or about October 1998, Ms. Johnson contacted her nephew, Dr. Watts, and 
asked him to help her secure a diagnosis and treatment for her complaints of stomach 
pain. (R. 280; id. 268; id. 250-51.) Dr. Watts is board certified in radiology and provides 
medical services in radiology at Utah Valley Regional Medical Center ("UVRMC") and 
elsewhere. (R. 252-56.) Dr. Watts arranged for testing to be done by Dr. Wynn 
Hemmert ("Dr. Hemmert"), a gastroenterologist. (R. 249-50; i± 268.) 
Dr. Watts also arranged for a surgical consultation with Dr. Kohler. (R. 267.) Dr. 
Kohler evaluated Ms. Johnson and determined that her gallbladder should be surgically 
removed. (R. 248.) On November 3, 1998, Dr. Kohler operated on Ms. Johnson and 
removed her gallbladder. Dr. Watts did not participate in the surgery. (R. 245-47.) Ms. 
Johnson did not completely recuperate after the surgery, and she contacted Dr. Watts to 
ask for his assistance because Dr. Kohler was out of town. (R. 268.) Dr. Watts 
readmitted Ms. Johnson to UVRMC on November 6, 1998. (R. 244.) After Ms. Johnson 
was readmitted to the hospital, Dr. Watts provided supportive care and observed her until 
Dr. Kohler returned to UVRMC on November 8, 1998. (R. 240-43.) On November 9, 
1998, Dr. Kohler performed a second surgery on Ms. Johnson, during which a small 
perforation in her bowel was found. (R. 238-39.) 
After the second surgery, Ms. Johnson remained in the hospital until November 
24, 1998, when she was discharged. (R. 265-66.) After being discharged, Ms. Johnson 
returned to her home and recuperated over the next nine months. (R. 263-64.) Ms. 
Johnson testified that she has experienced problems with fatigue, weight gain, scarring, 
and physical strength after her treatment at UVRMC. (R. 262-64.) Ms. Johnson also 
believes that her divorce and the debts allegedly incurred by her ex-husband are related to 
the surgery. (R. 258-61.) 
Ms. Johnson's Expert Testimony 
Darwood Hance, M.D. ("Dr. Hance") was Ms. Johnson's radiology expert and is 
board certified in radiology and nuclear medicine. (R. 236.) Dr. Hance testified that Dr. 
Watts, as a radiologist, had no role in the decision to operate on Ms. Johnson. Rather, Dr. 
Watts referred Ms. Johnson to Dr. Kohler, who determined that Ms. Johnson needed 
surgery. (R. 227-28; 235.) Dr. Hance testified that he is not qualified to offer opinions 
regarding general surgery issues. (R. 234.) 
Dr. Hance does not know whether Ms. Johnson had any medical complications or 
complaints after her discharge from UVRMC on November 24, 1998. (R. 231.) Dr. 
Hance also does not know whether Ms. Johnson's condition improved after her discharge 
from the hospital on November 24, 1998. (R. 230.) Dr. Hance testified that he would not 
offer any opinion that connects the treatment provided at UVRMC in 1998 to any of Ms. 
Johnson's current complaints. (R. 229; 231.) 
Dr. David Anaise ("Dr. Anaise") was Ms. Johnson's expert in general surgery. In 
response to a question regarding Ms. Johnson's current condition and medical 
complaints, Ms. Johnson's attorney objected, stating "Objection. He's not an expert on 
damages, he's not called on as an expert on the extent of damages." Despite the 
objection from Plaintiffs counsel, Dr. Anaise testified as follows: 
Question: Dr. Anaise, have you been asked to render 
opinions with respect to the causation of any injuries or any 
complaints that Ms. Johnson has as they relate to any of the 
events that took place from November 3rd, 1998 through the 
conclusion of the discharge from her second hospitalization? 
Answer: I think I'm rendering an opinion about one 
particular damage and that was the high probability of having 
the bowel obstruction. That I thought was directly caused by 
the surgery that preceded. I was not asked to comment, but 
mentioned in passing things like hypoglycemia or fluid 
management and pneumothorax, and so on, because I thought 
they were going to be covered by the other experts. 
Question: Doctor, apart from her supposed increased 
likelihood of suffering from a bowel obstruction of some sort, 
do you intend to testify at trial that to a reasonable degree of 
medical probability any of Ms. Johnson's complaints or 
problems are proximately caused by any of the events from 
November 3rd to November 24th, 1998? 
Answer: I was not prepared for this question and I 
think it's covered by other experts. 
Question: Do you intend to testify at trial as I just 
indicated, that to a reasonable degree of medical probability 
any of Ms. Johnson's current complaints, problems, are 
proximally caused by the events that took place between 
November 3rd and November 24th, 1998? 
Answer: I'm not prepared to testify to that at this 
junction. I was led to believe that other experts would cover 
that. I think it would be redundant, at most. 
Question: The answer, as you sit here today? 
Answer: The answer is no. 
(R. 220-21 (objections and responses thereto omitted).) 
Dr. Anaise also testified that once Ms. Johnson's bowel was nicked in the first 
procedure and her operative wound was closed, a second surgery was necessary to 
address the perforation. (R. 222.) Dr. Anaise did not testify that advice or care provided 
by Dr. Watts after the first surgery but before the second surgery caused or is related to 
any injury or damage to Ms. Johnson. 
The Trial Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment To Dr. Watts 
Dr. Watts moved for summary judgment on all claims, arguing that Ms. Johnson 
had failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence against Dr. Watts. (R. 218-81.) 
Specifically, Dr. Watts argued that Ms. Johnson had failed to prove that his alleged 
deviation from the applicable standard of care was the proximate cause of her alleged 
injuries. (R. 273-75.) Dr. Watts also argued that Ms. Johnson had failed to establish by 
expert testimony that she suffered an actual, rather than a speculative or future, injury. 
(R. 272.) 
In her opposition, Ms. Johnson argued that reasonable inferences drawn from the 
testimony of Dr. Barton and Dr. Hance created an issue of material fact as to whether Ms. 
Johnson would have suffered any injury "if Watts had not negligently referred plaintiff to 
Kohler, the surgeon." (R. 333.) In support of this argument, Ms. Johnson submitted an 
affidavit from her radiology expert, Dr. Hance (the "Hance Affidavit"). (R. 321-33.) 
Dr. Watts moved to strike the Hance Affidavit, arguing that certain paragraphs 
should be stricken for lack of foundation, and that other paragraphs should be stricken 
because they are contradicted by or are inconsistent with Dr. Hance's prior deposition 
testimony. (R. 396-401.) In particular, Dr. Watts argued that paragraphs 7(g) and 7(h) of 
the Hance Affidavit should be stricken because Dr. Hance had conceded that he is not 
qualified to offer opinions regarding surgical issues, including the question of whether 
Ms. Johnson should have been operated on by Dr. Kohler. (R. 399-400.) Dr. Watts also 
argued that paragraphs 7(l)-(n) should be stricken because as a radiologist, rather than a 
surgeon, Dr. Hance lacked foundation to imply that a surgeon would have operated on 
Ms. Johnson sooner than November 9, 1998. (R. 399.) Finally, Dr. Watts argued that the 
trial court should reject Dr. Hance's attempt, in paragraphs 7(l)-(n) of his affidavit, to 
"supplement" his deposition testimony by asserting that Ms. Johnson suffered certain 
injuries as a result of Dr. Watts' treatment. (R. 396-98.) 
In his reply memorandum in support of summary judgment, Dr. Watts argued that 
Ms. Johnson had failed to provide expert testimony to support her claim that Dr. Watts 
should be held liable for damages in connection with the decision to remove her 
gallbladder, because it was uncontested that Dr. Kohler alone was responsible for the 
decision to perform surgery. (R. 406-07.) Dr. Watts also argued that Ms. Johnson had 
not presented expert testimony to connect her alleged complications after the second 
surgery on November 9 to any treatment provided by Dr. Watts. (R. 404-06.) In 
addition, Ms. Johnson failed to present expert testimony suggesting that a surgeon would 
have operated on her any sooner than surgery was in fact performed, on November 9. (R. 
404-05.) Finally, Dr. Watts pointed out that in her opposition memorandum, Ms. 
Johnson did not dispute that she had suffered no permanent or lasting damage as a result 
of her treatment at UVRMC from November 3 to 24, 1998, and also that Ms. Johnson 
had failed to provide expert testimony to connect Dr. Watts5 treatment of her at UVRMC 
to any damage after November 24, 1998. (R. 403-04.) 
On June 16, 2003, the trial court heard oral argument on Dr. Watts' motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 1015.) Argument on Dr. Watts' motion to strike the Hance 
Affidavit, as well as on other pending motions, was also scheduled for that day. The trial 
court asked to hear argument on the summary judgment motion first, and ultimately did 
not hear argument on or reach the various other pending motions, including the motion to 
strike the Hance Affidavit. 
On July 7, 2003 the trial court issued a memorandum decision granting summary 
judgment to Dr. Watts on all claims. (R. 806-11.) Regarding the claim that Dr. Watts 
negligently referred Ms. Johnson to Dr. Kohler, the trial court determined that there was a 
lack of proximate cause between Dr. Watts' referral to Dr. Kohler and the damages 
claimed by Ms. Johnson. In sum, the trial court ruled that 
[bjecause Dr. Watts' involv[e]ment with Ms. [Johnson's] care 
ended with his referral to an experienced surgeon, Dr. Kohler, 
there is no causal connection between any harm Ms. 
[Johnson] suffered from surgery and Dr. Watts['] initial 
referral. Where Dr. Kohler acted independent of Dr. Watts, 
there is a break in the chain of causation. Ms. [Johnson] has 
failed to provide evidence sufficient to establish even a prima 
facie case of negligence. 
(R. 809.) 
Regarding the claim that Dr. Watts negligently treated Ms. Johnson during the 
days when Dr. Kohler was out of town following the first surgery, the trial court ruled 
that 
Ms. [Johnson] did not provide expert testimony that Dr. 
Watt's [sic] failure to consult with Dr. Kohler until November 
9 actually caused specific complications. There is no 
evidence showing that surgery should have, or would have, 
been performed if Dr. Watts had contacted the surgeon 
earlier. The facts as provided in [Dr. Hance's] affidavit do 
not establish that Dr. Watts' actions caused any additional 
damages to the plaintiff not already remaining from the first 
surgery. Accordingly, . . . there is no evidence of causation[.] 
(R. 808.) The trial court did not rule on Dr. Watts' motion to strike the Hance Affidavit. 
On July 22, 2003, the trial court entered an order dismissing Ms. Johnson's claims 
against Dr. Watts. (R. 815-17.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both factually and conceptually, it makes sense to consider Ms. Johnson's 
allegations in this suit as two separate claims. Ms. Johnson's first claim is based on Dr. 
Watts' referral of Ms. Johnson to Dr. Kohler, and her second claim is based on Dr. Watts' 
treatment of Ms,. Johnson during November 6-8, 1998, while Dr. Kohler was out of town. 
Summary judgment in favor of Dr. Watts on the first claim should be affirmed 
because, as a matter of law, Ms. Johnson has not made out a claim for negligent referral. 
Ms. Johnson has not contended that Dr. Watts and Dr. Kohler were partners or agents, 
that Dr. Watts knew that a referral to Dr. Kohler was likely to result in negligent 
treatment, or that Dr. Watts participated in either the decision to operate on Ms. Johnson 
or in the surgery itself. Summary judgment should also be affirmed because, as the trial 
court ruled, Ms. Johnson did not present evidence from which a reasonable inference 
could be drawn that Dr. Watts' referral to Dr. Kohler was the proximate cause of Ms. 
Johnson's claimed damages. Finally, summary judgment should be affirmed because 
discouraging treating physicians from making referrals to competent, qualified specialists 
would have disastrous effects on the provision of health care to Utah's citizens. 
With regard to Ms. Johnson's second claim, summary judgment should be 
affirmed because, as the trial court recognized, Ms. Johnson was unable to present any 
evidence to show that surgery would have been done earlier if Dr. Watts had contacted a 
surgeon. Ms. Johnson also failed to present evidence to show that Dr. Watts' failure to 
consult with Dr. Kohler sooner actually caused specific complications, or that Dr. Watts' 
actions caused any additional damages to Ms. Johnson that would not already have 
occurred as a result of the first surgery. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DR. WATTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE ALLEGED 
NEGLIGENCE OF DR. KOHLER, A SPECIALIST TO WHOM DR. 
WATTS REFERRED MS. JOHNSON. 
Ms. Johnson would have this court accept her contention that by the very act of 
referring her to Dr. Kohler, Dr. Watts ensured that she would then undergo surgery. For 
that reason, she argues, Dr. Watts should be held liable for Dr. Kohler's alleged 
negligence. (Aplt. Br. at 16-17, 25.) Stated briefly, the centerpiece of Ms. Johnson's 
argument on this point is that "without a surgical referral, there would have been no 
surgery and no injury." (Id. at 25.) In Ms. Johnson's view, then, any referral to a 
surgeon carries with it the probability—even a guarantee—that surgery will ensue. This 
theory, of course, makes little sense, and completely discounts a surgeon's province to 
evaluate a particular patient and decide whether surgery is appropriate. Ms. Johnson's 
claim was properly dismissed because not every referral to a surgeon will result in 
surgery. 
Ms. Johnson's oversimplification of the role of a referral from one physician to a 
specialist, and her concomitant attempt to hold Dr. Watts liable for Dr. Kohler's alleged 
negligence, should be rejected for at least three reasons. First, Ms. Johnson has not 
alleged an actionable case of negligent referral, even if such a cause of action is found to 
exist under Utah law. Second, as the trial court found, there is no evidence to support a 
conclusion that Dr. Watts' referral to Dr. Kohler was the proximate cause of Ms. 
Johnson's alleged injuries from the first surgery. And third, adopting Ms. Johnson's 
position would deter physicians from making referrals to qualified specialists when a 
patient's needs call for such a referral, and thus would have far-reaching negative 
consequences for the health care of Utah citizens. 
A. There Is No Cause Of Action For Negligent Referral. Even If This Court 
Finds Such A Cause Of Action Exists Under Utah Law, As A Matter Of 
Law Ms. Johnson Has Not Alleged Facts Sufficient To Make Out That 
Cause Of Action. 
Summary judgment on Ms. Johnson's first claim should be affirmed because she 
is not entitled to recover against Dr. Watts for Dr. Kohler's alleged negligence in 
performing the first surgery. A majority of courts across the country have held that a 
"physician who calls in or recommends another physician or surgeon is not liable for the 
Whether there is a cause of action for negligent referral under Utah law was discussed at 
the summary judgment hearing, but was not briefed by either party below. (R. 1015 at 
33-38.) Under the affirm on any grounds doctrine, this court can affirm the grant of 
summary judgment to Dr. Watts "if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory 
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the 
trial court. . .was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by 
the lower court." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, TflO, 52 P.3d 1158 (quoting Dipoma v. 
McPhie, 2001 UT 61, ^18, 29 P.3d 1225). 
other's malpractice, at least where there was no agency or concert of action, or no 
negligence in the selection of the other physician or surgeon." W.R. Habeeb, Liability 
of One Physician or Surgeon for Malpractice of Another, 85 A.L.R.2d 889, *3 (2003); 
see, e.g., Estate of Traynor v. Bloomsburg Hosp., 60 F. Supp. 2d 412, 415-16 (M.D. Pa. 
1999) (stating "if the general practitioner does not realize that the specialist's care is 
inadequate, he or she is not necessarily liable, but may be liable if a general practitioner . 
. . should have recognized the inadequacy and taken appropriate steps"); Billebault v. 
DiBattiste, 1998 US Dist LEXIS 7399, *15 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ("[U]nder normal 
circumstances a referring physician's duty to a patient is extinguished once another 
physician exercises independent medical judgment as to the patient's medical care in 
performing a surgical procedure."); Reed v. Bascon, 530 N.E.2d 417, 421 (111. 1988) 
('The general rule is that a referring physician will not be liable for the other physician's 
negligence unless there is some control of the course of treatment of one by the other, 
agency or concert of action, or negligence in the referral."); Hopkins v. Mills-Kluttz, 77 
S.W.3d 624, 627-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) ("A referral of a patient by one physician to 
another competent physician, absent partnership, employment, or agency, does not 
impose liability on the referring physician."); Ruane v. Stillwell, 600 N.Y.S.2d 803, 804 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Weidner v. Nassau, 1993 Pa. D. & C. LEXIS 8, ** 2 (1993) 
(holding "[a] referral is not negligent if the referring physician exercises due care in 
3
 Although this rule has been followed in scores of cases across the country, Dr. Watts 
has been unable to find a Utah case discussing this cause of action. 
making the recommendation," and "a physician who merely recommends another is not 
liable for the other's negligence or malpractice"). 
One rationale underlying this majority position is that a physician owes a fiduciary 
relationship to his or her patient. The physician-patient "relationship is predicated on the 
proposition that the physician has special knowledge and skill in diagnosing and treating 
diseases and injuries and that the patient has sought and obtained the services of the 
physician because of this expertise." Carson v. Fine, 867 P.2d 610, 617 (Wash. 1994); 
see also 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians & Surgeons § 166. This fiduciary relationship creates 
"certain obligations] on the part of the physician," the primary obligation being to 
"exercise . . . due care and skill in the treatment of [the] patient." 61 Am. Jur. 2d 
Physicians & Surgeons § 167. This duty of due care "includes, among others, [the 
physician's] obligation . . . to refer [the patient] to a specialist if necessary." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
Because part of Dr. Watts' duty to Ms. Johnson was to refer her to a specialist 
once he determined that he could not provide the care she needed, and because Ms. 
Johnson has not made out a claim for negligent referral, as a matter of law Ms. Johnson is 
not entitled to recover against Dr. Watts for the damages she claims resulted from either 
Dr. Watts' referral to Dr. Kohler or the surgery Dr. Kohler subsequently performed on 
her. 
Even if this court concludes that Utah law favors a cause of action for negligent 
referral, it should do so within the contours of the well-established majority position 
described above. Under that rule, a referring physician would be liable for a specialist's 
negligence only if the referring physician knew the specialist was likely to provide 
negligent care, or if the referring physician and the specialist shared an agency or 
partnership relationship, or if the referring physician participated in the specialist's 
•decision regarding a course of treatment. The undisputed facts show that none of these 
conditions are met in this case. 
First, Dr. Watts believed that Dr. Kohler was a qualified and able physician, and 
did not know or have any reason to know that Dr. Kohler's care of Ms. Johnson was 
likely to be negligent. Dr. Watts testified in his deposition that 
[i]n fact, I asked [Dr. Kohler] to see my aunt because of his 
competence. He's a good surgeon. He's got a very low 
complication rate, and I'm sure did the best he could at the 
time of the surgery. . . . I have great confidence in Dr. Kohler, 
and I still consider him to be a very good surgeon. 
(Deposition of Gary Watts, M.D. at 74:3-11. This page of Dr. Watts' deposition 
testimony is included in the addendum to this brief as Exhibit A.) Ms. Johnson has not 
produced any evidence to suggest that Dr. Watts knew or should have known that Dr. 
Kohler's treatment might potentially be negligent. 
Second, Ms. Johnson has not produced any evidence to suggest that Dr. Watts and 
Dr. Kohler shared an agency or partnership relation, and in fact they did and do not. 
Finally, the undisputed facts show, and Ms. Johnson acknowledges, that Dr. Watts played 
no role in Dr. Kohler's decision to perform surgery on Ms. Johnson and did not 
participate in the surgery in any way. (Aplt. Br. at 16; R. 245-47; R. 388.) 
In sum, as a matter of law Dr. Watts should not be held liable for responding to his 
aunt's request for help; realizing that he was not the appropriate physician to determine 
the course of treatment for her complaint; and referring his aunt to a competent, 
knowledgeable specialist. 
B. Dr. Watts' Referral Of Ms. Johnson To A Qualified Specialist Was Not The 
Proximate Cause Of Her First Or Second Surgery, Nor Was It The 
Proximate Cause Of Her Claimed Damages From Those Surgeries. Dr. 
Watts Did Not Participate In The Decision To Perform Surgery On Ms. 
Johnson. 
As the trial court recognized, Ms. Johnson was unable to provide expert testimony 
to establish that Dr. Watts' referral of her to Dr. Kohler was the proximate cause of her 
claimed damages. (R. 808-09.) Dr. Watts, who is a radiologist, referred Ms. Johnson to 
Dr. Kohler because he recognized that he was not able to treat her ailment. Dr. Watts did 
not play any pant in the decision to perform surgery on Ms. Johnson. (Aplt. Br. at 16; R. 
245-47; R. 388; R. 811.) That decision was Dr. Kohler's alone, and Dr. Kohler's 
decision that Ms. Johnson needed surgery was an independent break in the chain of 
causation Ms. Johnson would have this court draw between Dr. Watts' referral and the 
allegedly negligent surgery performed by Dr. Kohler. Because Ms. Johnson cannot 
present expert testimony to establish proximate cause, summary judgment should be 
affirmed. See, e.g., Bansasine v. Bodell 927 P.2d 675, 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (stating 
trial court may rule on proximate cause as a matter of law if "there is no evidence to 
establish a causal connection, thus leaving causation to jury speculation"). 
Ms. Johnson attempts to create an issue of fact by referring to the Hance Affidavit, 
which, she contends, shows that if Dr. Watts had consulted Ms. Johnson's primary care 
physician, Dr. Salisbury, no surgical referral would have been necessary. (Aplt. Br. at 
15-18.) At best, the Hance Affidavits sheer speculation on this point. Moreover, Dr. 
Hance testified that, as a radiologist, he is not competent to testify as to surgical issues. 
(R. 387.) The Hance Affidavit is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of disputed 
material fact; Ms. Johnson has truly presented "no evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could infer causation[.]" Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1292 
(Utah 1996). 
C. Utah Law Should Not Favor A Policy Of Discouraging Physicians From 
Referring Patients To Qualified Specialists When The Referring Physician 
Is Unable To Properly And Completely Treat The Patient's Complaints. 
Ms. Johnson's contention that a referring physician should be held liable for a 
specialist's alleged negligence—even when the referring physician played no part in 
deciding on the specialist's course of treatment—would have far-reaching and seriously 
negative policy effects for the provision of healthcare to Utah's citizens. If Ms. 
Johnson's position were accepted by this court, every physician who refers a patient to a 
specialist would be liable for the decisions made and treatment provided by that 
specialist. The very purpose of referring a patient to a specialist is to facilitate a more 
specialized review of the patient's symptoms, diagnosis, and treatment. If Ms. Johnson's 
position were adopted, treating physicians would face an extreme disincentive to refer a 
patient to a specialist. This, of course, would do harm to the patients themselves: 
physicians would either refuse to treat patients unless they knew for certain, at the outset, 
that they were able to treat the complaint; or they would decline to make proper and 
necessary referrals to competent specialists. Both of these outcomes should be avoided. 
In sum, as a matter of law, Ms. Johnson is not entitled to recover against Dr. Watts 
for Dr. Kohler's alleged negligence. Ms. Johnson has not alleged facts that would bring 
her claim within the scope of a negligent referral cause of action, even if that cause of 
action exists under Utah law. Ms. Johnson cannot produce any evidence to suggest that 
the mere act of referring her to a surgeon meant that surgery would necessarily ensue. 
And finally, adopting Ms. Johnson's position would discourage treating physicians from 
consulting specialists in an effort to better care for their patients. For these reasons and 
the reasons argued by Dr. Watts below, this court should affirm the grant of summary 
judgment and hold that Dr. Watts' referral of Ms. Johnson to a qualified and competent 
specialist does not create liability on Dr. Watts' part for Dr. Kohler's alleged negligence. 
II. DR. WATTS SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES 
ALLEGEDLY FLOWING FROM MS. JOHNSON'S SECOND SURGERY. 
On appeal, Ms. Johnson argues that there is a triable issue of material fact on the 
question of whether Dr. Watts' care of Ms. Johnson after her readmission to the hospital 
on November 6, 1998 caused additional damages. Specifically, she argues that the 
testimony of Dr. Hance and Dr. Barton shows that Ms. Johnson might have suffered 
"increased severity of infection, larger abscess, additional medical bills, additional 
hospitalization, additional pain, additional scarring, fever[,] and toxicity" as a result of 
Dr. Watts' alleged delay in calling in a surgeon after Ms. Johnson was readmitted on 
November 6. (Aplt. Br. at 25.) This argument should be rejected and summary judgment 
affirmed. 
Ms. Johnson does not deny that a second surgery was required as a result of the 
perforation to her bowel during the first surgery. As argued above, Dr. Watts cannot be 
held responsible for any damage or injury caused by the first surgery, including the 
perforation and the need for a second surgery to repair the perforation. As a result, Dr. 
Watts cannot be held responsible for any damage or injury caused by the necessity of a 
second surgery. Dr. Watts provided no treatment to Ms. Johnson after November 8, 
1998. Accordingly, Ms. Johnson was required to prove that Dr. Watts' treatment of her 
between November 6 and November 8 caused an actual and specific injury. Ms. Johnson 
did not meet this burden. 
There is no evidence in the record and no expert has testified that any 
complication suffered by Ms. MacLeod was actually related to a "delay" in surgery 
between November 6 and November 8. Even accepting every fact set forth by Ms. 
Johnson, the only damages that she can claim in connection with her November 6 
through November 8 hospitalization are a marginal increase in the size of an abscess and 
some unquantified increase in infection. There is no expert testimony connecting these 
real or potential conditions to any other post-surgical complication, injury, or damage. 
Although Dr. Barton testified that there was some increased risk of complication during 
this time period, he did not testify that the "delay" actually caused a specific 
complication. And as Ms. Johnson conceded during the briefing of Dr. Watts' summary 
judgment motion, the mere risk of a complication is not sufficient to support a claim for 
damages. While Ms. Johnson experienced hypoglycemia, fluid overload, and 
pneumothorax after the second surgery and prior to her discharge, there is no expert 
testimony connecting these physical conditions to treatment provided by Dr. Watts. 
Ms. Johnson suggests that if she had undergone surgery prior to November 9 she 
might have avoided post-surgical complications. However, no expert has testified how 
many days prior to November 9 a surgeon would have taken Ms. Johnson in for surgery 
if Dr. Watts had requested a consultation on November 6, 1998. In fact, no expert has 
testified that Dr. Kohler or any other surgeon would have operated sooner than November 
9. Dr. Hance conceded in his deposition that he is not qualified to offer opinions 
regarding surgical issues. (R. 387.) Accordingly, Dr. Hance is not competent to testify 
4
 See Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973 (Utah 1993). 
that Ms. Johnson should or would have been taken to surgery any sooner than November 
9, 1998.5 
Similarly, while Dr. Barton stated that a second surgery was necessary, he did not 
testify that the second surgery should have been performed any sooner than November 9, 
1998. (R. 315.)6 Dr. Watts cannot be held responsible for any alleged complications 
associated with a "delay" in surgery given the absence of expert testimony stating that a 
consultation on November 6 would h'ave led to surgery before November 9. Because Ms. 
Johnson cannot demonstrate a connection between Dr. Watts' treatment and any actual 
harm or injury sustained by her, summary judgment is appropriate. 
5
 A Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Darwood Hance, M.D. was filed concurrently with 
Dr. Watts' reply in support of his memorandum for summary judgment. The basis for the 
motion was that Dr. Hance lacks foundation to offer opinions regarding surgical issues 
and that Dr. Hance's affidavit is inconsistent with his deposition testimony. The trial 
court did not rule on Dr. Watts' motion to strike the Hance Affidavit. 
6
 Dr. Barton was asked: "If an earlier diagnosis . . . of perforated viscus had been made .. 
. earlier than November 9, you've indicated that surgery is the only choice in such a 
situation . . .?" Dr. Barton replied, "I think so." (R. 315.) While Dr. Barton's answer 
does suggest that a surgery would be necessary to treat the perforation, Dr. Barton did not 
state that surgery would necessarily have been performed on the same day the perforation 
was diagnosed. 
7
 If this court concludes that there is a triable issue of material fact on the question of 
whether Dr. Watts' alleged delay in securing a surgical consultation caused Ms. Johnson 
any damages during the November 6 to 8 time period, it should first remand for the 
limited purpose of obtaining a ruling on Dr. Watts' motion to strike the Hance Affidavit. 
If the Hance Affidavit is stricken, this court should affirm the summary judgment. If the 
Hance Affidavit is not stricken, this case should be remanded for the sole purpose of 
determining the nature and extent of Ms. Johnson's alleged damages, if any, arising from 
Dr. Watts' treatment of her from November 6-8, 1998. 
III. MS. JOHNSON HAS CONCEDED THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS 
APPROPRIATE ON ANY CLAIMS THAT HER POST-NOVEMBER 24, 
1998 DAMAGES WERE CAUSED BY DR. WATTS. 
In deciding this case, this court should hold that Dr. Watts is not liable for any 
alleged damages occurring after Ms. Johnson's November 24, 1998 discharge from the 
hospital. As part of his summary judgment motion, Dr. Watts argued that Ms. Johnson 
failed to provide any testimony to connect his treatment to any harm or injury she claims 
to have suffered after her discharge from the hospital on November 24, 1998. (R. 403-
04.) Specifically, Ms. Johnson failed to produce any expert testimony to show that any 
actual injury or damage was caused by Dr. Watts' alleged negligence. By failing to 
oppose this argument, Ms. Johnson has conceded that she cannot recover for the 
possibility of future complications resulting from the surgeries. See Hansen v. Mountain 
Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973 (Utah 1993). 
In her opposition to Dr. Watts' motion for summary judgment, the only damages 
or injuries Ms. Johnson identified allegedly occurred during her hospitalizations, from 
November 3-24, 1998. (R. 334-36.) Thus, even assuming there was expert testimony to 
support a nexus between Dr. Watts' alleged negligence and Ms. Johnson's injuries or 
damages, Dr. Watts is entitled to partial summary judgment ruling that Ms. Johnson 
cannot recover against him for any claimed injury or damage that may have occurred 
after her discharge on November 24, 1998.8 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment on Ms. Johnson's first claim should be affirmed because Ms. 
Johnson has not alleged facts sufficient to make out a claim for negligent referral, even 
assuming there is such a cause of action under Utah law. In addition, Dr. Watts' referral 
of Ms. Johnson to Dr. Kohler was not the proximate cause of Ms. Johnson's injuries. 
Any holding discouraging physicians from making referrals to competent specialists 
when their patients' needs require referrals would do a great disservice to the citizens of 
Utah. 
Summary judgment on Ms. Johnson's second claim should be affirmed because 
Ms. Johnson failed to present expert testimony to connect Dr. Watts' treatment of her 
Although not addressed explicitly by the trial court in its memorandum decision, 
implicit in the ruling is a finding that Dr. Watts is not liable for any damages Ms. Johnson 
claims to have suffered after November 24, 1998. The trial court found that "[a]s a 
matter of law, . . . Dr. Watt's [sic] referral was not the cause of any damage suffered by 
the plaintiff," (R. 808), and that Ms. Johnson had not established that "Dr. Watts' actions 
caused any additional damages to the plaintiff not already remaining from the first 
surgery." (Id.) In addition, the trial court found that Ms. Johnson "did not provide expert 
testimony that Dr. Watt's [sic] failure to consult with Dr. Kohler until November 8 
actually caused specific complications." (Id.) Parsed, the trial court found that Dr. Watts 
was not liable for damages flowing from the first surgery; that Dr. Watts was not liable 
for any damages resulting from the unproven "delay" in surgery from November 6-8; and 
that Ms. Johnson did not suffer any damages other than those caused by the first surgery. 
As a result, it is reasonable to imply in the trial court's decision a finding that Ms. 
Johnson did not suffer any damages following her November 24, 1998 discharge from the 
hospital. 
from November 6-8 to any actual harm or injury she sustained. Finally, this court should 
also hold that, as a matter of law, Dr. Watts is not liable for any injuries or damages 
allegedly suffered by Ms. Johnson following her discharge from the hospital on 
November 24, 1998. 
ADDENDUM 
The addendum to Ms. Johnson's opening brief contains all the parts of the record 
required by Rule 24(a)(l 1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, Dr. 
Watts refers the court to that addendum, along with the record on appeal. See Utah R. 
App. P. 24(b)(2). In addition, Dr. Watts has attached one additional page of his 
deposition testimony as Exhibit A. 
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A. Dr. Kohler has a terrific reputation--
Q . Okay . 
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competence. He's a good surgeon. He's got a 
very low complication rate, and I'm sure did he 
the best he could at the time of the surgery. 
And I felt badly that things turned the way they 
did. But I have great confidence in Dr. Kohler, 
and I still consider him to be a very good 
surgeon . 
Q . Okay. 
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Q. Please. 
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suit. 
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Q. Okay. Did she mention what financial 
considerations she was concerned about? 
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